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THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH CHINA AND JAPAN

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Before proceeding I beg your leave to say that I stand here not as a representative of any authority, government or association, but simply as a student of international politics and a private citizen of Japan, and consequently, for what I speak I am solely responsible.

In the discussion of such a big and comprehensive subject as that before us, it is well, I believe, to confine myself to one phase of it, namely, "The Policy of the United States in the Pacific," as it is revealed in its dealings with two of the most important factors in the Pacific problem, Japan and China. In trying to elucidate my point, however, I have, to confess at the outset that I find it difficult to get a clear, intelligent understanding of the American policy in the Pacific and am sometimes at a loss to know whether there is any definite policy at all. For the glorious record of diplomacy America has achieved in Tokio and Peking during many decades past has lately been much obscured, if not totally eclipsed, by another story that tells of America's dealings on its own soil with the Asiatic neighbors.

Take the case of America with Japan. In the history of international relations no record is so unique as that of the intercourse between Japan and the United States during the first five decades of its existence—so romantic in its inception, so pervaded throughout by mutual good-will, and so fruitful of untold benefits to mankind at large. Strikingly dramatic is the scene that introduces the first chapter of that intercourse. To the nation still enjoying a torpor of centuries and only equipped with bows and arrows, swords and spears, Commodore Perry suddenly makes his advent with the stately fleet of eight ships, armed with 230 cannons. And, contrary to the world's expectation, the adroit soldier-diplomat succeeds in forcing open the door of the nation that had for ages been hermetically closed against aliens, without a shot being fired, a man wounded, or a junk sunk. For his was truly a peaceful mission. Behind that outward display of force, under that glittering uniform of the Commo-

dore, there was hidden the spirit of American friendship toward Japan which he had been commissioned to disclose. That Japan soon discovered it and remembers it with gratitude is evinced by the monument which now stands on the very spot of Perry's first landing, and which, backed by the everlasting green hills of the Mikado's land, overlooks the blue waters of the Pacific that binds in common embrace the two nations on its opposite shores.

The genuine Americanism found its finest expression in Perry's successor, Townsend Harris. With that simplicity, honesty and frankness worthy of a true American, and with consummate tact and infinite patience, Harris overcame the innumerable obstacles, ignorance, suspicion and prejudice, put in his way, and finally signalized his triumph by becoming the confidant and adviser to the Shogun's government. The American policy of justice, fair dealing, and friendliness, thus inaugurated, was consistently pursued by all the succeeding administrations, and put into practice by able envoys who represented the President of the United States at the court of the Mikado—Pruyn and Bingham, Buck and O'Brien, Griscom and Anderson.

The refunding of the Shimonoseki indemnity, the willing heart proffered for the revision of old treaties, the good office rendered to bring about the peaceful settlement of the Russo-Japanese war, the commercial treaty negotiated under the Taft administration that facilitated the successful conclusion of new treaties with other powers—these are a few instances, the prominent posts on the road of Japanese-American intercourse, that will recall to us hundreds of other instances: herein we witnessed the realization of what General Grant said "Whatever America's influence may be, I am proud to think that it has always been exerted in behalf of justice and kindness."

On the part of Japan, I am also proud to think that she has given a ready and most appreciative response to this generous policy of America, and that it has received its merited reward. Indeed, the sentiment of gratitude toward America has pervaded the whole nation. To be an American was, therefore, the surest badge which commanded respect and love of the Japanese people. Mr. Seitz, managing editor of the *New York World*, well says: "There is something painful about the childlike faith and grateful good-will manifested toward the American visitor by the people of Japan, in perpetual acknowledgment of their debt to the United States."

No record of international relation, let me repeat, is, then, more beautiful and ennobling than that which has blessed the American-Japanese intercourse for the past half a century—justice, moderation, magnanimity on one side, and gratitude and appreciation on the other.

No less inspiring is the story that tells of the American-Chinese relation. From the time of Burlingame to the time when President Wilson took the first step among powers to recognize the Republic of China, American diplomacy in China has singularly been free from selfish motives, and has uniformly sought to be guided by the noblest principles of international intercourse. No wonder, then, that China has at all times regarded the United States as her best friend and trusted adviser. Especially should China be grateful for the masterly diplomacy of John Hay, which, together with the efforts of other friendly powers, was instrumental in saving her from disruption.

Turn from this bright page of diplomatic history to another page wherein is written the story of America's treatment on its own soil of the Chinese. We are at once bewildered by the striking contrast presented on the two pages. While America in common with European powers, prompted by their own humanitarian ideas, has forced thousands of missionaries upon the unwilling Chinese, and proclaimed therein the doctrine of the open door, she has on her own part closed tight her doors against the Chinese. More than this, the Chinese on this shore have been made the objects of derision. They have sometimes been mobbed, outraged, murdered. And these wrongs have seen no due redress. I am not taking upon myself the self-imposed task of an advocate of China. Nor am I picking a quarrel with the American Congress for enacting the Chinese exclusion bill. For my part, I believe there is a just ground for the enactment of such a law; the American nation has every right to protect itself by any means it deems fit from the danger of being overcrowded by undesirable immigrants, whose home government is too weak to control in its hand the matter that affects an international relation. What I am chiefly after is to know what is the American policy in the Pacific. Is there one American policy in the Pacific for this side of the water, and another for the other?

Far more glaring becomes the inconsistency of the policy when it is studied in the light of the recent happenings in Japanese-American relations. That the United States will not place Japan in the same category of nations with China is, I presume, a premise I can safely

take for granted. For, although geography assigns Japan among Asiatic nations, she occupies by culture and civilization a totally different plane from that attained by her Asiatic neighbors. Since Perry introduced her into the family of nations, Japan has by dint of energy reconstructed her whole scheme of life, political and social, and is now evolving a unique civilization of her own, whose standard is not different from that of the west. Moreover, Japan has clearly demonstrated her ability to stand upon her own feet and defend her rights and privileges. Japan has a strong government capable of enforcing its will upon her own people, and of fulfilling any pledge made to foreign governments. She has, for instance, kept the so-called "gentlemen's agreement" with utmost faith, in fact, so rigidly that at the present day no student without means can ever hope to come to this country for education. In short, Japan has every right, I confidently believe, to receive the same treatment accorded to great powers. I would have considered the foregoing remarks as vain and out of place, had not the California episode given me a rude shock and forced upon me the necessity of stating in succinct terms Japan's position, in order to strengthen the point I am soon to make.

There is, however, no need of entering here into the details of the California-Japanese question, still less into its pros and cons. After all, California is only one of 48 states forming the Union. What most vitally concerns our subject is this: Is the American policy in the Pacific such an unsettled, weak policy, as to be over-ruled and dictated by the whim of one state? It is, of course, presumptuous for a foreigner like myself to attempt to give any answer to such a question. He will, however, be permitted to say how difficult it is for him to understand the action of the California legislature in enacting, in face of the strongest protests of the Washington government, the anti-alien land law, which is clearly and distinctly discriminatory against the Japanese, nay, in fact, solely aimed against them, and, hence, unjust, unfair, and at direct variance with the policy America has pursued toward Japan for the past half century. The only explanation that suggests itself to me is that the American people have not yet uttered their voice in unmistakable terms on their policy in the Pacific, loud and distinct enough to command respect and obedience to it by every state in the Union. As a consequence, the strangest of anomalies such as we have witnessed last spring is presented. In that episode it is sad to remember how the good and mighty President of the United States sent protest after protest to

the California legislature, asking it to desist from passing the Webb bill; how the secretary of state flew across the continent to plead at the door of the California assembly for delay in action while efforts were being made to meet its wishes by diplomatic means. These protests and pleadings, however, proved of no avail. California enacted the land law, then went her own way, busying herself with the Panama Exposition and the like. In the meantime the President and the secretary of state took patiently, to use a mild term, upon their own shoulders the burden of devising the ways and means of mending the international issue raised by California's action in which they took no hand whatever, nay, against which they had so strongly protested. I have perfect confidence that the issue will see an ultimate amicable settlement based upon broad and just principles and in harmony with the best interests of both nations, although how and when it will be accomplished is beyond the knowledge of the speaker who is outside the sacred pale of diplomacy.

What we, your neighbors, are most concerned about is to see the definite formulation of the American policy in the Pacific, which would of necessity put to rest such trouble as that in California. Is it to be based upon the same principles of justice, fair dealings, and friendliness that have guided the American policy during the past toward its Asiatic neighbors, and to be put into practice on both sides of the ocean? Will it be an imperial or pacific policy? Will the magnificent navy of the United States which could easily be made the first and finest of all navies in the world, if America so wishes, by the enormous resources she has at her command—will this navy be used for the maintenance of order and peace in the Pacific, or will it be employed to overawe other nations and to perpetuate the wrongs perchance perpetrated by America? Will the splendid position America occupies in the Pacific with Hawaii, Guam and the Philippines as stepping stones over the waters—will these spots stand as sentinels of light and security for the commerce of the world to prosper, or as mere strategic grounds for the American navy to maneuver? Now and then an idle talk of giving up the Philippines is heard among some Americans. We, your neighbors, never wish that such a thing will come to pass. For one, I heartily agree with ex-President Taft in thinking that a grave responsibility has been laid upon the American people that should cause them ever to retain the islands and govern them for the benefit of all—the Filipinos, Americans and the world at large. The Philippines again constitute

an important factor in the Pacific problem. Statesmen have not been lacking who foresaw its importance. Mr. William H. Seward pointed out, fifty years ago on the floor of the American Senate, that "the Pacific ocean, its shores, its islands, and the vast region beyond, will become the chief theatre of events in the world's great hereafter." Ex-President Roosevelt declared not many years ago that "the Pacific era, destined to be the greatest of all and to bring the whole human race at last into one comity of nations, is just at the dawn." Have the American people as a whole risen to the height of prophetic vision that inspired those statesmen? Have the people at large come to the full realization of the great significance of the Pacific drama? And in the unfolding of this interesting act, I am happy to say, Japan is always ready to join hands with America in heartiest coöperation.

The vast reaches of the Pacific rebuke the narrow suggestions of covetousness and jealousy. The ocean is broad enough to accommodate without jostling all the navies and merchant fleets of the world, now in existence or hereafter to come. Those who have never seen the Pacific's vast expanse or visited its distant shores, are the only people who fall victim to such claptrap, which Professor Coolidge happily calls "mastery of the Pacific" or "dominion of the seas." Peace and amity can reign among great nations interested in the Pacific for thousands of years to come.

To conclude, then, as I began, by referring to the American Japanese relations. That the old relation between America and Japan, of a tutor and a pupil, would continue, is not to be expected. Japan has already attained her maturity. She will look up to America as a friend or an ally; the United States will treat Japan as an equal. If they are competitors in the Chinese market, each will prove to the other a manly and healthy rival. This passing of old relationship, however, never means that with it the former cordial friendship should also go overboard. God forbid. The reasons that urge their closer bond are stronger and louder than ever. The common ideals of civilization which both America and Japan are solicitous to impart to Asia at large, the common policy in China—the maintenance of its integrity and of the principle of the open door—the common interest in the Pacific to develop its vast hidden resources, and the ever increasing importance of trade between the two countries—these are strong arguments for the ever closer American-Japanese friendship, which no sophistry could elude, no local issue overwhelm.